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For instance, Salt and Kitching suggest that some labour migrants move to a country like the UK precisely with the purpose of improving their language skills. However, cultural distance may not always be the case in international migration. The creation of cultures of migration — for instance, through intensive and sustained chain migration between two countries — may have transmitted sufficient information in the origin country so that locals know all about life in a destination area without having ever been there them- selves see the classic study of Algerian migration to France by Sayad Once again, this is not a clear-cut situation but one where much blurring occurs.

Moves within vast countries such as China and Russia, juxtaposed against international migration over fairly short distances — e. Indeed, in terms of cultural differ- ence, the gap is bound to be much wider between the rural Siberian pea- sant and the urban Muscovite than between citizens of Belgium and Luxembourg. But geographical distance is important in terms of the costs involved in migration.

The barriers to international migration, often related to the cost of travel, searching for work, the cost of learning and adapting to a new culture, acquiring legal papers and evading arrest, are much greater than for an internal move. This higher cost, however, is counter-balanced by the expectation that earnings abroad will be higher not only to justify and cover these costs, but also to attain higher goals such as capital accumulation. Indeed, remittances from abroad are usually higher than internal transfers.

I will come back to this particular point in the second part of this chapter. This results chiefly from the costs involved in each migration — and therefore the time to recuperate them — and the impossibility to move back and forth when migrants lack docu- mentation. Internal migration has been strongly linked to development and urbanisation, while interest in international migration is clearly related to the integration of migrants into destination countries and, more recently post , to security concerns.

Internal migration, although more important in terms of volumes of people and perhaps as important in terms of remittances and other socio-economic impacts as international migration, seems to have fallen behind Adepoju ; Deshingkar ; IOM a; Skeldon A recent spur in interest on internal moves, related especially to LEDCs in Africa and Asia, is once more a one-sided approach, in spite of the many interlinked dimensions with international migration.

Let us now examine these links in more detail. In the case of the Philippines, De Jong et al. As far as sequencing is concerned, the existing literature has provided two overarching typologies, which suggest a step-wise migration pattern though few potential others. As this diagram is precisely the tool I use in Chapter 4 to map out the patterns resulting from my field- work, below I only focus on the literature prior to that. Ample evidence for this type of stage-migration can be found in several studies on migration from Mexico to the US see the review in Lozano-Ascencio et al.

Empirical evidence from Mexico and elsewhere also suggests a more refined and complex process: migration also involves direct moves from villages to the largest cities within countries internally, as well as from vil- lages directly to international destinations. Often provincial towns are not able to absorb large numbers of rural migrants and provide the expected economic and social benefits. This process may develop over time, which causes the migration to change direction. A similar example is migra- tion from rural Thailand to urban Singapore and Japan in the s.

Rural Thai migrants omitted moves to regional towns and used only one step — the capital Bangkok — as an intermediary station before emigrating abroad Skeldon However, migrants may move directly from rural areas abroad, as in the case of Mirpuris Pakistan and Sylhetis Bangladesh migrating directly to the UK, a process in which colonial ties were central Skeldon The development of new links may also result from migration channelled by smugglers, as in the case of direct migration from Veracruz, Mexico, to the US, where historical links were absent Del Rey Poveda This spatial move can also be linked to social mobility, especially when considering the integration of the second generation.

However, the review of this literature is beyond the scope of my book, which focuses on origin countries. For example, in Mexico, Lozano-Ascencio et al. On the other hand, international migration may stimulate internal moves within origin countries in a form of replacement migration. Areas of out- migration benefit from an increased level of economic prosperity, but suf- fer from labour shortages; other internal migrants from poorer regions step in to fill the vacancies.

Here, internal migrants work primarily in the construction industry, fuelled by investment in housing from interna- tional returnees. First, these two migration types may occur more or less simultaneously. Zabin and Hughes showed that a more complex step-wise migration took place amongst Oaxacans in Mexico. The family first migrated to the export-oriented zone of Baja California, in the northern border with the US.

Thus, after a family move internally, only the husband emigrates abroad while the wife and children remain in the internal destination, often forming an important cushioning environment should the emigration of the husband fail. Second, an internal move may be followed by international migration and then return to yet another internal destination in the origin country. Lozano-Ascencio et al. The importance of these multiple linkages between internal and interna- tional migration becomes more relevant when they are considered within the broader debate of migration and development, to which I now turn.

Its complexity derives from a number of factors. These include: origin or destination country perspec- tives, macro- or micro-analyses, discipline-based approaches, concerns over short- or long-term impacts, varying types of migration and develop- ment spatially and over time and, not least, various ways of measuring the two.

As briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the migration-development debate revolves around two main questions. Does development or underdevelopment generate migration? Does migration lead to development and underdevelopment? Before continuing with the elaboration of the links between internal and international migration and development, I present briefly, at the risk of oversimplification, three main positions that have been central to this de- bate.

The consequential dislocation of labour from rural to urban and from periphery to core areas only serves to fuel the process of capital accumulation in core areas. Origin countries and rural areas, in particular, are starved from the loss of the most active, creative and young populations, especially when they are highly educated, who, when going abroad, either undergo a de-skilling process or do not gain any new skills.

Such are the negative effects of acute labour shortages that, in a study of migration from Yemen, children had to replace adult male labour Fergany Remittances are not development-conducive because they are often spent on what are consid- ered unproductive purchases: consumption such as food and clothing and conspicuous goods such as lavish houses and expensive customary ri- tuals , thus hindering any structural change to ease dependency on them Fergany ; Lipton When mi- grants return, not only do they not bring new skills with them, but they re- turn because they have either failed abroad or are retiring Cerase The best and the brightest — thus the successful ones — not only stay in des- tination countries, but gradually sever links with their home country, cut- ting thereby any hope for any positive contribution there.

This line of thinking was particularly prominent during the s and s, being presented in what became a torrent of literature. It is not the purpose of this chapter to review this, especially since a number of detailed and very effec- tive reviews already exist for gloomy conclusions, see Lipton ; for a more balanced view, see Appleyard ; De Haas ; Hermele Arguments used to support the previous posi- tion are turned on their head.

Since I will come back to this optimistic per- spective later on in this section, I do not go into detail here. At this point, it suffices to note that this line of thinking, like the previous one, drew much interest and generated a large body of literature. Taylor, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Massey and Pellegrino a, b; also Taylor make a very effective critique of the theoretical and empirical literature that had presented the consequences of internal and international migration for community and national development in a negative light.

They maintain that there is reason to be more optimistic, since the previous negative con- clusions failed to take into account the complex, especially indirect ways in which these links are played out. A third position has become increasingly prominent in recent years and more relevant to the complexities and inter-dependencies of the age of glo- balisation. De Haas , who has recently provided a critical in-depth ana- lysis of the key migration-development scholarship, likens the history of the swing from one position to the other with that of a pendulum.

Using development as a lens for analysing migration, we can once again identify two positions. The first of these is that underdevelopment — in other words, poverty, low economic growth, socio-economic inequalities, etc. The second position is that in fact growth and development are the motors of migration, until a certain level of development has been reached — the so-called migration hump — when migration then decreases see e.

To conclude this very brief summary of a rich, broad and complex litera- ture, there is no doubt that internal and international migration and devel- opment are symbiotically interrelated. However, several questions remain as to how this interaction actually works in practice for migrants, their communities and their countries of origin. In the remaining part of this sec- tion I review some of the key aspects of this relationship, which later frame the discussion of my empirical material. In addition, bad governance, conflict, environ- mental disasters, population pressures as well as better life prospects else- where and the search for adventure and freedom all affect different types of migration.

Some very poor people thus do participate in migration, but only over short dis- tances, usually within the same country and overwhelmingly between rural regions. What makes neglect of internal migration even more unacceptable is the issue of numbers: individuals participating in internal migration in the world far outweigh those categorised as international migrants, particularly in LEDCs.

Just from the sheer magnitude of numbers involved in internal migration, one can imagine that although individual remittances might be low, espe- cially when labour is employed in rural areas, they ensure the survival of a much wider group of poorer households and individuals. Internal migration can thus potentially play a greater role than international migration in redu- cing poverty because of access to income through migration for a larger section of the population World Bank For example, according to a study, although the poverty-reduction effect of internal remit- tances in China amounted to an estimated 1 per cent, this translated to twelve million fewer poor people in UNDP Adams and Page found that in the 74 develop- ing countries they surveyed, most international migrants came from the income groups that were just above the poverty line.

But over time, as the better-off migrate and migration networks are consolidated, opportunities for poorer people to migrate abroad become increasingly available through the reduced cost of migration Massey et al. Other researchers have questioned the notion of absolute poverty gener- ating migration. Instead, they argue that it is inequality and relative depri- vation that serve as a stimulant for people to migrate.

In their study of 61 households in Mexico, Stark and Taylor found that Mexico-US mi- gration was a strategy used to improve the position of households relative to others in their origin village. Linked to the question of inequality influencing migration is also the question as to whether migration reduces inequality and which type of migration does so.

This in-country polarisation may occur through return migration that takes place primarily to large urban areas. De Haas a observes in Morocco that successful interna- tional migrants return to an urban area in contrast to less well-off returnees who go back to the countryside. The key factor often used to measure, or link to, inequality is the distribution of remittances, to which I now turn. Like migration, remittances also affect individuals and structures at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels.

Unrecorded flows, i. In spite of these figures, it must be remembered that often the poorest countries do not par- ticipate so much in international migration. Consequently, they are more dependent on overseas development assistance ODA as an income source Ghosh Within developing countries there are concerns that the bulk of these transfers go to the better-off, since they constitute the majority of interna- tional migrants.

Thus, the inequalities that existed before migration took place are reinforced Lipton Nonetheless, poor people may benefit from international remittances through the trickle-down or multiplier effect, for instance, related to increased demand for local goods and services De Haas a; Taylor A figure of 2 per cent might not seem impressive at first, but at an individual level the difference it makes can be significant. Overwhelmingly in African, but also in some Asian and Latin American countries, studies have found that internal remittances were an important part of the income portfolio for rural residual families Deshingkar Deshingkar suggests that in the Asian situation this might result from a deeper commitment women feel towards their families.

This contradictory evidence is found throughout most of the literature worldwide, which emphasises the need for more focused and systematic attention to the role that gender plays in remit- tances see e. These situations often reflect gender roles and relations that are, in turn, embedded in deep-set cultural norms.

As for the Albanian situation, further light will be thrown on this later in the book. For remittances to make a difference to origin communities, simply recording the size of the sums sent is not enough. Perhaps more important is the way they are used by recipients. Most researchers agree that the pri- mary use of remittances is consumption, which ensures the survival of the family, including in refugee situations on Afghan refugees, see Jazayery However, opinions are divided on the topic of development beyond survival.

Remittances affect the well-being of families by enabling them to improve their diets, their accommodation, their apparel and thus constitute a healthier and more productive workforce and population. Furthermore, through remittances there is increased access to better education and health as well as improved continuation of family rituals and obligations.

Construction and associated sectors in Albania, Bangladesh, Morocco and other such countries with high emigration figures and levels of remittance inflows have provided jobs for a considerable number of people within the country Afsar ; De Haas a. From a macro-level perspective, remittances contribute significantly to foreign exchange earnings and capital formation, although the latter may often be for small and medium enterprises. In the absence of overarching and well-planned strategies, the sustainability of such remittance-led development is put to question Skeldon In contrast, the social dimension of the im- pact of migration on sending communities has been rarely explored system- atically Hugo ; Piper Two perspectives can illuminate this dimension in relation to remittances.

First, there is a need to acknowledge more directly that financial remittances have a number of impacts on migrants and areas of origin that go beyond the simple economics of income growth and GDP. Their social and cultural impacts are reflected in the ways in which these monies are perceived by migrants and wider communities and how they are used in the areas of origin.

Furthermore, such transfers do play a role in shaping models, norms and expectations in these origin com- munities. Indeed, some would argue that social remittances might even be more im- portant than financial transfers in the long run Kapur However, the way social remittances are created and the degree to which they are transferred to origin communities depend on the intensity of interaction of migrants with host societies and the socio-economic context where mi- grants establish themselves.

These can vary by country and by migration situation. These models differed significantly from those transmitted by Egyptian migrants who emigrated to the Gulf, this time re- flected in higher birth rates.

Other situations involve the transmission of models and ideas about poli- tical organisation, participation and democratic processes, more generally Skeldon This is especially relevant in situations where home gov- ernments and policymakers have failed to deliver reliable democratic struc- tures for the people. They find that this does indeed take place and migrants play an important role in helping to strengthen de- mocracy in their countries of origin through the diffusion of democratic ideas and behaviours.

Once again, however, most of this debate has focused around international migration situations see e. It is thus not clear from the available literature if internal migrants effect more change in this respect than — or do this differently from — international mi- grants. Finally, it must also be remembered that host societies offer both positive and negative role models, which can equally be transmitted to ori- gin communities Levitt Socially constructed gender roles are important also when considering the outcomes of migration for development.

This is reflected, for instance, in the transfer and deployment of remittances Carling , but also in the type of social change that migration may bring about. Afsar 6 shows how rural-urban female migrants in Bangladesh moved from having no income of their own prior to migration to 80 per cent of them having earned enough through migration to put them above the poverty threshold.

In turn, these migrant women played a significant role in social change in origin communities, through financing and encouraging education of their siblings and other relatives, including other women. Evidence from other countries suggests opposite effects, however. Migration, whether internal or international, can reinforce gender inequal- ities at worst, or have neutral effects on gender relations. Where emancipa- tion and empowerment do take place, the effects may last only during the migration episode.

Such a mixture of outcomes is also the case for migration of the highly skilled. She argues that a combination of patriarchy, capitalism and immigration regula- tions helps create a gendered structure of such international migration. Apart from a heavy burden of work and care for one another, the very young and the very old are deeply affected by the loss of close emotional links with, respectively, their adult parents or children.

Describing such situations in China, Murphy b points out how their social conditions have worsened, followed by dra- matic consequences such as a rise in suicide rates. A number of discus- sions look to return migration as a way to mitigate such adverse effects, whereas the transnational turn in migration studies has shown the impor- tance of transnational practices and forms of care.

According to this perspective, the optimal situation that brought most benefits to origin countries was one where emigrants, after several years of work abroad — often a figure of ten to fifteen years of optimal duration was suggested Olesen — returned to inject their money and skills into the local economy.

However, as empirical evidence from migration selectivity has shown, in the case of return, too, the literature suggests that those migrants who are at the two poles of the continuum — i. Financial transfers upon return differ from remittances that migrants send to their family and relatives while abroad. However, the debates and concerns about their use and effectiveness in the development of origin countries have been similar to the discourse on remittances.

Of the minority who gain skills, these can rarely be applied in origin areas, particularly in rural settings. Thus settlement in urban areas upon return may further exacerbate regional disparities. This is particularly the case when origin countries or regions have to grapple with political upheavals and crisis on the Western Balkans and Central Asia, see e.

Black et al. Migrants can and do contribute to their origin countries and communities without having to return there. One of these ways is through transnational and translocal engagement, briefly mentioned earlier. The final section in this chapter will now explore this option within a social fields framework.

It has been clear from this discussion that the two migration types differ from one another in their features and their impacts. On the other hand, these differences are not always clear-cut and much blurring occurs. Furthermore, capturing the different ways in which they impact developing countries is not easy. What I hope to have achieved through this discussion is to show that internal and international migration are interlinked in various ways.

In addition, since most LEDCs of origin participate in both types of migration at the macro- and micro-levels, the analytical integration of these migration types becomes imperative. Such an approach would first and foremost require a bridging of origin and des- tination areas linking migrants and their families together.

The concept of such a fluid space of interaction and interconnectedness has been employed before in the migration literature, but it has overwhelmingly referred either to internal or international migration. Let us now look if there is scope in using some of these concepts to link the two and integrate them into one analysis, which ultimately has migrants at its centre. Starting with internal migration, it was the Manchester School of Anthropology that pioneered the social field approach during the study of rural-urban migration in South-Central Africa.

In fact, the migratory process that took place resembled circulatory moves as rural inhabitants would move to the cities for wage labour, but return to work their land in the vil- lage when shortages in urban employment occurred. This approach informed later work — four decades later — on migrants, this time in an international setting. The pioneering work on migrant trans- nationalism of US anthropologists Glick Schiller, Basch, Szanton Blanc, Fouron and, later, Levitt included the concept of transnational social fields Basch et al.

This was an adjusted term to reflect situations where migrants moved between two countries rather than internally, and was ap- plied to migration from the Caribbean to North America. In fact, the French-Algerian sociologist Sayad had a couple of decades earlier pleaded for such an approach. Through his work on migration from Algeria to France, he emphasised that before she or he becomes an immi- grant, the migrating individual is first an emigrant.

This resonates — although in a different setting — very closely with the Manchester School which recognised that the tribal-rural out-migrants were at the same time also colonial-industrial city in-migrants. Building on this discussion, I suggest that there is scope to apply the concept of the social field to encompass the interlinkages between internal and international migration. In this context, such an intra-national and transnational social field is constituted by sets of interdependent, heteroge- neous and overlapping networks or sub-fields of social relations through which ideas, practices and resources are unequally exchanged, organised and transformed.

The importance of this approach is threefold. First, the focus is the social relations as units of analysis, rather than spatial origin or destination categories — although geography is also important, not least as it is closely related to geopolitical and other power relations. And third, migrants and their families are not only connected between two places of initial origin and destination location, whether this is an internal or interna- tional one, but also among these destination places as well.

Thus, multidi- mensionality and pluri-locality can potentially address the complexity of combined internal and international migration processes and trajectories through a less spatially and methodologically fragmented analysis. Thus, in order to avoid the risk of superficiality, given the length constraints of a single book chap- ter, I have focused on selected key works that I consider to be the most pertinent to the aims of my research and to my approach of the study.

The key conclusion to draw after this review is that there is evidence to support the claim that internal and international migration are closely linked in the ways they are deployed by migrants and in the ways they impact develop- ment. Poverty and inequality in migrant-sending areas are impacted differ- ently by internal and international monetary and non-monetary remittances and by migration more broadly.

As migrants from developing countries are increasingly using both migration types as integral parts of their livelihood strategies, it is imperative that an integrated approach to these debates is adopted. In this chapter I have proposed the — I would claim — relatively original theoretical notion of intra-national and transnational social field, which I employ as a key framing device for the main analysis of this study, evidenced in my results, found in Chapters 4 through 7.

Now, in the next chapter, I take the reader to Albania and survey the evolving scenario of migration and development in that country, based on existing literature and secondary data. However, the post-communist migration had specific features which make it one of the most noteworthy flows in the world.

The aim of this chapter is to pro- vide an overview of these migrations — both international and internal — and the ways they have been linked to development. To set the post-com- munist flows into perspective, I start with a brief historical account divided into two periods — migration until and during the communist years. Their relationship with development is ana- lysed through the impact of remittances, demography and spatial effects. Return migration is briefly elaborated in the closing sections.

In the aftermath, his family and other Albanian nobles fled to Italy, while others moved north to the Dalmatian coast and south to Greece. It is estimated that around , Albanians emigrated during this time Tirta Many Albanian men fled to escape blood vendet- tas and the Ottoman persecution, yet others simply emigrated to escape poverty or to work in various trades and professions within the borderless Ottoman Empire. This emigration is known in the Albanian history and collective memory as kurbet.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Albanians looked to fulfill their aspirations overseas and became a very small part of the transatlantic mi- grations from Southern Europe to North America and Australia. Some of them were refugees who fled the bloodshed that resulted from the Balkan Wars and the two World Wars. Others sought to improve their life by emi- grating for work in the rapidly expanding industrial cities of North America and the agricultural industries of Australia.

Labour migrants were in the majority men, but especially after the s, more women emigrated to join their male relatives or their future husbands abroad see e. Photo 1 is a rare record of such historical Albanian female migration. The impacts of these migrations on origin areas were mixed and com- plex.

Demographically, emigration, especially overseas, stripped entire villages and regions of their labour force, since most emi- grants were men of working age. However, emigration also became a motor for economic and social progress, by bringing in much-needed money through remittances as well as skills and knowledge and more open societal and democratic norms.

But this effect was mostly felt in the areas of origin of migrants — overwhelmingly the south and south-east of the coun- try Tirta Given that very few overseas migrants originated from the north, the socio-economic gap — including educational levels and gender relations — between the north and the south of the country widened UNDP-Albania As a result of these historical migrations, significant communities of Albanians formed in destination countries, including Greece, Italy, Romania, Egypt and the US Tirta Remarkably, they have preserved their language and cus- toms after more than five centuries Hall Although numerically insignificant when compared to US-bound migra- tion, I mention it here because of its link with the post Albanian mi- gration to Australia, especially from my study villages.

Meanwhile, internal movements were not negligible either. Internally displaced people sought refuge from the border areas that were being con- stantly disputed until the end of World War II. Equally, peasants were mov- ing to the slowly expanding cities where they hoped to find work and escape poverty and a hopeless rural existence. However, most of these were situated in mountainous terrain see Figure 1. By , Tirana had emerged as the most important city in Albania with almost 60, inhabitants Tirta Albania emerged from World War II economically devastated.

The power vacuum created after the withdrawal of German troops was swiftly filled by the communists, who consolidated their position as the leading political force. Albania embarked on the road to socialism, framed within a political ideology of self-reliance, isolation, strong ethno-nationalism, but also class warfare and ruthless purges of dissident opinion. There were various cru- cial factors of influence that framed the policy of the state as well as the trajectories of many individuals and families during almost half a century of communist rule: the reconstruction of industry and the national econo- my, yet strict controls over urbanisation; the retention of rural population, yet a high birth rate accompanied by a growing impoverishment of vil- lages; a worsening of the gap in living conditions between rural and urban areas.

Two distinct phases of internal relocations can be distinguished. The first, corresponding roughly to , was characterised by large-scale internal movements, albeit centrally regulated, and a high degree of urbani- sation. In contrast, the second phase that followed and which continued lar- gely until the end of the communist era, was characterised by stricter regu- lations that aimed at retaining rural populations in their place. Let us look at these internal movements in a little more detail.

In the first five post-war years, internal migration took place primarily towards rural lowland areas. However, starting from the early s and with the help of the Soviets, the country embarked on an ambitious industrialisation project, which required labour for the various manufacturing and production plants. This labour boosted the urban popu- lation of existing towns where most industrial projects were situated. A number of new towns were specifically created at this time around these industries; the majority of them was associated with metal extraction and processing, energy production and armaments Rugg This time, the collectivisation of land and livestock into Soviet-type socialist coopera- tives stripped peasants of their private possessions and turned them into a rural proletariat.

Some of them joined the urban proletariat by moving to the cities. Numerically, movements during this first phase were relatively large- scale. Most of this was attributed to rural-urban migration. However, having set the industrial revolution in motion and being guided to a certain extent by the relationship with a new ally, China, the party-state turned its focus more strongly on agriculture.

This initiates our second phase, starting in the early s, during which the Albanian authorities pursued a policy of rural retention and minimal urbanisation. Others used marriage as a way to circumvent the rules. These measures were particu- larly aimed at curbing rural-urban migration. There was also a certain amount of urban-rural migration, especially of cadres and intelli- gentsia towards the villages during the Cultural Revolution in the mid- s.

Other movements were regional in character, directed from remote highlands towards the regional cities or rural areas surround- ing them. Both of these patterns are in fact a continuation of what had become apparent from the first decades of the twentieth century and which continued to be dominant after the collapse of the communist regime.

Tirana, more than any other city, was the focus of such moves — the most desirable destination for a considerable number of Albanians, espe- cially young people. In other words, migratory flows heading for Tirana experienced a deflection to the rural periphery adjoining it.

Since most would-be mi- grants were not able to obtain permission to move their residence to Tirana proper, they managed to migrate to one of the rural cooperatives or state farms close to the city. A significant number of them commuted to the capital, and their aim continued to be settlement in the capital itself.

Thus, the post- large-scale migration to Tirana was not without historical precedent. Externally, emigration became a matter of high treason and anyone caught trying to escape the Albanian gulag was either shot on sight or put behind bars for many years, while their families were internally exiled. As the country became isolated after subsequent breakdowns in relations with its former allies, its militarisation further increased. First, defection became the high- est form of treason against the homeland, punishable by no less than ten years imprisonment and even death, as well as internal exile for the family of the defector.

As a result, emigration between the s and was but a trickle. As the country broke its relations with allies, it lost the much-needed financial and technical help it was receiving from them, which was crucial for the large industrial projects.

Consequently, while the economy was rela- tively buoyant with Soviet help, this could not be sustained with the Chinese support that replaced it, and deteriorated even further when the tap of foreign aid was turned off. Meanwhile, agriculture had barely mechan- ised and although some productivity was gained, this was largely due to labour input, a combination of population growth and immobility.

In fact, from the mids, population grew at a constant of more than 2 per cent, a rate higher than any other country in Europe besides Turkey. However, by that date massive spontaneous emigration and internal migration had already started. I now discuss some of the features of this migra- tion, drawing on a number of key analyses such as Barjaba and King , King , , King and Mai , and King and Vullnetari It continues with a presentation of some fig- ures, followed by a discussion of the evolving character of Albanian migra- tion.

Last but not least, I provide an analysis of the integration process of migrants in their major destination: Greece. The first, during , was triggered by the violent and chaotic exit of the country from 45 years of poverty, appalling violation of human rights and almost hermetical closure to the outside world. Eventually, they were allowed to leave for the West, primarily to Germany, Italy and France, where they became the nuclei for the fol- low-up chain migration of the years to come.

In March and then later in August of , around 45, Albanian migrants reached the southern Italian shores by boat. Meanwhile, more significant events were taking place on the southern frontier, as thousands trekked from all over the country towards and over the harsh border mountains to reach Greece Photo 3. These numbers are unknown as it was impossible to keep records, and there was much to and fro movement.

The second intense movement followed the collapse of unsustainable pyramid investment schemes in Interest rates reached almost 50 per cent a month, which of course could not be sustained Jarvis Their collapse in early led to a period of political and economic turmoil verging on civil war in some parts of the country. This chaos produced another boat exodus to Italy in the early spring of Initially, 10, Albanians were accepted by Italy, but further sea-borne migrations were repulsed.

The third moment refers to the migration influenced by the Kosovo cri- sis of The Albanian economy recovered rapidly again after the fall of the pyramid schemes, principally due to more remittances sent by more emigrants. The Kosovar refugee crisis destabilised the already fra- gile economic and demographic situation, especially in northern Albania.

As Kosovar Albanians moved onwards to European asylum destinations, many citizens of Albania mixed themselves in with them. The evolving diasporic network then spread to the UK, especially after the influx of Kosovar refugees to that country. Further away, a new Albanian community was developing alongside the historical diaspora settled in the US. Let us now look at what story the statistics convey. However, since then, more and better data from Albania and the major destination countries have been provided, which helps piece together a quantitative picture of this migration.

The majority of them lived in Greece and Italy. By , this number had jumped to 1. The second source — the census — seems to provide compatible figures. Thus, the census data revealed an estimated total loss of , individuals due to migration between and INSTAT b: Of these, more than , represented the net loss calculated by the census residual method calculating net emigration as the residual of intercensal population change, minus the net difference between births and deaths.

The remaining , was estimated as the indirect impact of emigration, i. The census which took place in October will hopefully provide a more updated statisti- cal picture. It presents cumulative estimates at three points in time for the most impor- tant migrant destinations and their shares in the total for the respective year. Unfortunately, no disaggregation of this data by sex was available. We can draw a number of conclusions from this table.

First, we see a progressive increase of absolute numbers of Albanians living abroad, which more than doubled between and , even if we consider a more conservative total for For example, the corresponding figure from the World Bank data is 1. This increase may reflect improved rates of regularisation in host countries and better counting, but essentially continued emigration as the preliminary results of the census indicate.

The second conclusion to draw is that the major destination countries remain Greece and Italy, although as a proportional share of total emigrants there has been a steady decrease for Greece. Third, the data indicate a shift in the relative importance of the US and the UK, although the figure for the former may be somewhat ex- aggerated. There are five main sources of data collection on immigrants in Greece relevant to our case: a the regularisation programmes carried out in , , and ; b the , and censuses carried out by the National Statistical Service of Greece; c the residence permits register for third-country nationals TCNs held at the Ministry of Interior; d a reg- ister of the special identity cards known as EDTOs given to ethnic-Greek Albanians and held at the Ministry of Public Order; and e the quarterly Labour Force Surveys LFS.

First, the regularisations. Only 17 per cent of them were women Cavounidis However, the number of those who did not apply for regularisa- tion was considerable. Barjaba and King estimated that some , documented and undocumented Albanian citizens were living in Greece by the end of the s. No data have been released for the regularisation, other than a total figure of , applicants for all nation- alities and , grants of permits an acceptance rate of 93 per cent.

In Table 3. The fig- ures for the and regularisations Table 3. By then, most Albanians held some kind of regular permit which had to be renewed every two years; no data have become available on applications for renewal of expired permits Baldwin- Edwards 58, The census enumerated a little more than 20, Albanians although the numbers will have been much higher, as we saw earlier.

However, this might again be an underestimate for two reasons. Moreover — and more specific to the Greek context — as Baldwin-Edwards a suggests, many ethnic-Greek Albanian migrants might have been counted as Greeks by the enumerators. Gender ratios were markedly more balanced than previously, with around 41 per cent women enumerated in Baldwin-Edwards a: 5; Cavounidis The census took place in May and fully- analysed results are not expected to become available until ; prelimin- ary results only indicate a decrease in the total number of residents ELSTAT For a more updated picture, we turn our attention to the third source — the residence permit registers for ethnic Albanians Table 3.

The abso- lute numbers show a steady increase between and , followed by a decrease that is more pronounced in and again an increase in , although the number for this year is still below that of There are two possible explanations for this. The second reason might be that some Albanians may have returned to Albania, as a result of the recent global economic crisis in which Greece has been particularly hard-hit. However, this remains a speculation in the absence of statistics and studies.

As men- tioned earlier, these data do not include ethnic-Greek Albanians, to which we now turn. In the first instance, a figure of , was supplied;19 start- ing from , they were given EDTO cards of a three-year duration. If we presume that this number stayed more or less the same in the last two years, we can estimate the total number of Albanians with a regular status in Greece by at around , To this, we need to add an estimate of irregular migrants; some Greek researchers have argued that Albanians have a rate of 30 per cent irregularity in Greece, but this is contested as rather high by others see Maroukis If we accept a more conservative share than that — e.

In a country with a total population of around eleven million, this is nevertheless a con- siderable presence: around 6 per cent of the total population. More systematic and reliable data come from four sources. First, there are the periodic regularisations. They continued to retain this position there- after and, from , they have constituted at least a tenth of the total im- migrant population in Italy. Table 3. The third source of data for Italy is the municipal population register ac- cording to which Albanians at the end of numbered ,, or According to this source, they were the leading immigrant nationality.

Fourthly, the Italian census enum- erated , Albanians, or Each of the above sources has its own shortcomings. Second, both the per- mits to stay and the population register have a built-in tendency to over- record immigrant numbers, as they may not regularly update their records of when permits expire or migrants move out of a municipality. Third, undocumented migrants may be missing from these figures. However, recent estimates — which include irregular migrants — project higher totals.

For instance, the well-regarded ISMU institute in Bonifazi gives a total of , Albanians for mid By 1 January , this number had climbed to ,, an increase of 4. The US census reported , Americans of Albanian ancestry Orgocka , a figure that is close to the , reported by the Albanian authorities for Table 3. When we look at the second source, i. Thus, the true figure is much higher. According to Orgocka , the most important route of emigra- tion to the US has been through the annual Diversity Visa lottery,23 accounting for more than three quarters 76 per cent of Albanian immi- grants as of However, as migration matures and migrants settle, we see a steady shift towards family reunification becoming more important in recent years.

For example, immigration statistics from the US Department of Homeland Security reveal that in the shares of those settling per- manently in the US through a diversity visa were almost equal to those set- tling as immediate relatives of US citizens, i. In , however, the latter group saw an increase and the respective ratios were 35 per cent and 43 per cent. In contrast to emigration in Greece and Italy, the US hosts a more gender-balanced post-communist Albanian migrant community. For exam- ple, of those who settled permanently during — whether through a sta- tus change or new arrivals — some 52 per cent were women.

As in the case of the US, research on Albanians in the UK has been rather limited, thus affecting data availability and analysis. As such, data from official sources differ widely from those from community sources. The UK census enumerated 2, people born in Albania living in the UK, a signif- icant increase from the enumerated in the census. In fact, Albanians were the immigrant community with the highest increase in the intercensal period.

Some 36 per cent of these lived in London Kyambi However, according to community estimates, there were between 50, and 60, individuals from Albania living in the UK by the end of the second post-communist decade IOM Data from the UK census held in March will throw more light on this, especially as the community is now well established and maturing. First, we turn to intensity. Particularly in the early s, but also imme- diately after the chaos of , tens of thousands of emigrants left within a matter of months.

Analysing data from the ALSMS, Azzarri and Carletto show this downward trend taking place since while around 50, emigrants were estimated to have left the country in the year , only 25, did so in Cumulatively, by , a third of the total resident population had emigrated; by the end of the second post-communist decade, this share had reached 45 per cent World Bank This puts Albania in the top ten of emigration countries in the world in terms of emigration scale relative to its resident population.

Turning now to the next feature of the model, the ratio of irregular to regular migration, we see that here, too, much has changed. In , Greece counted 40 irregu- lar Albanian migrants for every one regularised, whereas in Italy this ratio was two irregular for every one regularised. For example, only around half of those who applied for the first stage of regularisation in the short-term White Card valid for a few months were able to progress to the second stage for receiving the Green Card longer term, valid for one year or more Baldwin-Edwards 44, Regularisation has probably been the major factor influencing the to and fro, characteristic of the s, especially to Greece.

The skoupa opera- tions of the Greek authorities, which fuelled this type of migration to a cer- tain extent, reduced dramatically after the regularisations. Although to-and- fro movements have not disappeared altogether, they are now qualitatively different from earlier years.

On the other hand, frequent transnational movements between the two countries are facilitated by the regular status, particularly for those who live in the border areas of Greece and originate from border areas in Albania, as we shall see from the empirical evidence later on in the book. Chronic food shortages and starva- tion threatened as strikes brought the already collapsing economy to a standstill.

High unemployment rates due to the closure of industries affected the urban population, while the destruction of farm infrastructures followed by a parcelised privatisation of farmland returned peasants to their pre-communist roots and living standards. Under these circumstances, mass emigration became the only means of survival for many households King This continued to be the case for most of the s and especially again after the collapse of the pyramid schemes in As tens of thou- sands of Albanians lost most and, in some cases, all their savings, even their house and other property, they turned to migration yet again as a way to survive.

King strengthens this analysis by presenting three additional migra- tion motivations, especially relevant for the first post-communist years. Mai clearly shows how many of these youth, particularly from urban areas, were motivated to emigrate by a quest for self-realisation. Third, a re-emergence of the blood feuds in northern Albania has served as a catalyst for many men to flee the country and seek safety abroad. That Albanian migration has been dynamic and rapidly evolving is more than justified in light of the above analysis and continues to be a valid observation, as the following discussion shows.

Even more alarming was the finding that more than 70 per cent of them had emigrated together with their families, which means that the chances for an eventual return are very small indeed. A number of these have emigrated through the Skilled Worker Visa programme run by the Canadian government. Experts noted that the coronavirus pandemic also appears to have slowed the movement of Albanian children to Europe significantly as borders closed.

Despite high hopes many face a harsh reality upon leaving. At 16 years old, Florim moved to France in mid-October without telling his parents, only to return home a month later. Alain Bouchon—whose association cares for minors in eastern France—said many of the children are sent abroad against their will by their parents. They often lack basic support systems when they arrive, making them acutely vulnerable.

But despite the hardships many face, some believe the sacrifice is worth the risk. In , Uruci and her husband fled Domen with their children after receiving threats for protesting the opening of a stone quarry near their home. After six months at a camp in Belgium, the parents were refused asylum and decided to leave their children, aged between two and nine-years-old at the time, with relatives.

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Dalai lama rammstein subtitulado torrent I stayed some days with the kindly, simple villagers, many of whom had earned their money, as did my guide, in other parts. Second, the importance of social networks, family and kinship — as theorised by the new economics of migration — has been crucial for sustaining much of this migration. Following these changes, international migration took place on a massive scale, primarily to neighbouring Greece and Italy, but also to other European Union countries and North America. Yet, this comes with significant responsibility to their communities in the way trust and information are used see also Markova I drita travel kontakt torrent it was nothing for the English. Being located along one of the two major roads linking Albania with Greece, the area further benefits from transport, trade and in- formation.
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